INTRODUCTION
A major switch in regulatory policy is currently ongoing in many European countries. Since the deregulation of the electricity markets the regulation of the remaining monopolies have most often been conducted using rather inefficient costbased methods. The restructuring of the distribution business has changed the ownership of the grids and therefore also the owners corporate agenda. Previously municipality or community owned grids and utilities are now merged with or acquisitioned into large corporations who apply higher aggregation levels, which may lead to that the small customers, are somewhat forgotten. This has increased the need for more efficient regulatory regimes.
While the cost based regulation models bases the distribution system operators' (DSOs) allowable revenue on their actual costs, performance-based regulation (PBR) tries to remove the direct link between cost and income by valuing the DSOs' performance and uses it as base for the allowable revenue. This creates rather strong cost cutting incentives and by using a performance yardstick, such as reference grid or company, or an efficiency frontier, consisting of the best performing DSOs in a comparable group [1] , the regulator is able to create a situation that resembles a competitive market. One of the risks when introducing strong cost cutting incentives is that the system reliability will suffer due to expenditure savings on investments and maintenance. To mitigate this, quality features are often included in the regulatory framework as a feature that primary affects the capped price or revenue.
The efficiency regulation in most countries is usually conducted in periods of several years during which the terms of the regulation are fixed. The quality of supply regulation is however most often conducted annually and affects the sequent or sub-sequent year's allowable revenue depending on whether the regulation is conducted ex-ante or ex-post. Because of the stochastic nature of the yearly system reliability the quality dependent part of the capped revenue or price becomes a financial uncertainty and is therefore a risk feature that the DSOs have to consider in the operation and as well as in their long-and short-term planning.
This paper presents an introduction into the complex area of managing the risks of PBR. A general strategic framework is presented and put into the context of a PBR environment. The focus lies on mitigating the uncertainties in negative regulatory output.
BASIC ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management (RM) is basically the corporate policies and practices adopted to gather information, analyse it, act on it and review the effects on the performance. Structured methods of conducting these policies and practices that are integrated with the long-term performance planning define a RM strategy. The increased demand for RM strategies is not only brought upon the DSOs as a consequence of the uncertain rewards or penalties within the regulation, but also in form of corporate governance, regulatory policies as well as owners' and partners' demands [2] , [3] .
The basic quantitative RM consists of three steps: Causal, accidental and consequence analysis. For each step there are several suitable methods that can be used [4] . Some methods are suitable for general use and some for specified applications. However, a strategy framework includes more than the basic quantitative RM since the development and application of a RM strategy is an iterative process in which continuous development and output feedback are essential features.
The implementing of the RM strategy is preferably done using a bottom-up top-down approach. This means that when initiated the development should start from the floor and work upwards in order to comprehend the knowledge of the people working with the practical issues and as the information is analysed and the strategy developed the application must come from the top to avoid sub-optimization Objective function, initially, the main area of interest is determined, in other words, what should be maximized or minimized and what are the constraints. Each area can be handled as separate objectives or be merged as a more complex objective function. The objective function determines the alignment of the process, then:
I Event Identification, within the given objectives the events that can have impact on the systems performance are identified, these events are potential hazards, the likelihood that these events will occur is also determined, either by using historical data, simulations or by qualified assumptions. The cause analysis also helps determining correlations between crucial events, which enables more effective use of counter measures. When the optimal set of counter measures are decided on and applied to the system the risk exposure picture has changed and it should therefore be reviewed, i.e. the net risks.
C C I I R R E E D D
IV Control Function, applying a strategy without means by which the process can be evaluated and controlled is ambitious work for little use. As mentioned earlier applying a RM strategy is an iterative process and if there is not control and evaluation feature there can be no feedback, which would make the process static.
Information on process development and communication between the various actors working in the process is a key feature and the corporate organisation dealing with the RM strategy must be such that it enables that. Fig 1 displays a flow chart of the presented RM strategy framework [5] . 
QUALITY OF SUPPLY REGULATION IN PBR
The regulator's primary task in when it comes to quality regulation of DSOs is to determine the 'worth of supply'. In other words, the regulator determines what quality features that are included in the regulatory framework, how these are measured and their financial value. How the regulator determines to manage these issues have great impact on what signals the regulation is sending out, i.e. the incentives that the DSOs have to act on regarding quality related issues such as investments and maintenance.
The general idea of quality dependent revenue or price caps is that the DSOs should have incentives to uphold or strive towards a quality level that corresponds to a situation where the marginal costs (MC) for investments equals the marginal benefit (MB) experienced by the customers of the investment. Further investments would have negative rate of return and would therefore not be economically feasible. The customers' experienced benefit of the quality of supply should therefore correspond to the regulators' definition of 'worth of supply'. The basic concept is illustrated in fig. 2 . Figure 2 . The cost function for reliability increasing investments can be assumed to have the characteristics as illustrated. DSOs with poor quality can simple and relatively inexpensive increase their quality, the marginal cost increases the higher quality is required. The regulators 'worth of supply' function is illustrated as a linear function, i.e. constant marginal benefit. The point for the optimal quality level is when MC equals MB.
THE VALUE OF QUALITY IN PBR
For DSOs subjected to PBR one significant risk feature is the regulation of quality of supply. The uncertainty in yearly system reliability due to the weather and the stochastic nature of technical equipment makes the quality regulation into a tangible financial risk feature. In order to mitigate this, the DSOs must maintain and invest in their grids so that they can uphold the optimal quality level and by doing so be rewarded in the regulation. How to identify failure events and how to perform system reliability analysis of distribution grids can be found in [4] , [6] and [7] . But since the definition of a risk is the probability that a negative event will happen together with the consequence/cost of the negative event, understanding the processing and valuation of quality features within the regulation is essential. The regulatory process for quality regulation can be describe as the five-step process displayed in fig 3. The steps included in the quality regulation flow chart in fig.  3 can be explained further as:
4 Adjustment function, the estimated costs of interruptions are transformed into a financial consequence through an adjustment function. 5 Output, the result of the quality regulation process is some kind of adjustment of the allowable revenue.
Step 1 is outside the regulation in form the events that the input data is based, step 2 -5 are set by the regulator and processed within the regulation. The configuration of step 2 -4 determines the incentives given the DSOs and therefore essential in their risk evaluation and when deciding on counter measures (step II and III in fig. 1 ).
This chapter presents the generic regulatory aspects of valuing and processing quality features together with some issues regarding correlations within regulations.
Key features in filtering and the interruption valuation
The potential impact that an action taken can have on the regulatory output depends first of all on some key features that determine the constraints and features of the filters and the interruption valuation. This means that the configuration of these key features very much implies how the DSOs ought to prioritise in order to achieve the maximum rate of return on reliability increasing actions. Previous research has showed [6] , [8] that the features that make the most significant impact on reliability improving actions are:
The weighing of the reliability indicators used in the regulation, by capacity or number of customers.
The customer representation, uniformly, according to customer categories, by customers density or according to grid tariff.
The overall valuation of quality as well as the valuation of each category relative the others. Now, if we consider different areas or grids, the customer density, the customer-type configuration, the energy consumption and so on will differ in each area. So will therefore each area's cost function describing how the investment costs correspond to the interruption costs as value in the regulation. Since the revenue or price adjustment is constant regardless of area the different areas will have individual optimal quality levels, which will be reflected in the DSOs' way to prioritise between the areas regarding investments, maintenance, and response times etc. Fig. 3 illustrates how three different areas with interruptionto-cost functions C 1 -C 3 , have the same return ratios and therefore individual optimal reliability targets, t 1 -t 3 , similar to fig. 2 . Each area has individual potentials for how much the DSO will be prepared to invest in their grids. To further clarify the impact of the key feature configuration within the quality regulation a simple comparison of the Residential area with rather low energy consumption.
Area 2
Medium density mixed area, industrial and commercial.
Commercial area, with medium to low energy consumption Area 3
Urban residential area with a large number of customers connected.
Industrial area with high energy consumption.
The comparison clarifies each feature configuration together with the typical customer category configuration that would be in the areas 1, 2 and 3 of fig. 4 as implied 2 in the each regulatory framework.
Adjustment function characteristics
How the interruption cost is transformed into a revenue or a price cap adjustment can be described as an adjustment function. The characteristics of such function determine the correlation between the return rate and the system's condition. Put into context, the adjustment function the final step in the process of transforming the DSOs lack of quality into an adjustment of its allowable revenue. Fig. 5 illustrates three examples such adjustment functions, the x-axis indicates the interruption cost based on the worth of supply and the yaxis indicates the allowable price or revenue set by the regulator. The linear function illustrated in fig. 5a describes a situation where basically the valued interruption cost equals the revenue or price cap adjustment, the marginal cost of interruptions is constant regardless of the system's quality condition. The regulator doesn't indicate the reliability target in any other way than through the 'worth of supply' configuration [9] . The return rate on quality increasing investments is high for DSOs with poor quality and decreases with higher quality levels. Both the long-and short-term incentive is to strive towards the fictitious reliability target that is individual for each DSO. If assuming that the uncertainty of the expected quality decreases with quality 1 The main purpose of comparing the Swedish and the Norwegian quality regulation is due to the fact that they differ in all the significant key features in quality regulation, hence a general key feature comparison. 2 It is important to point out that table 1 does not display the actual situation in Sweden and Norway, but the situation that the regulations imply. higher levels, the DSOs have incentives to find those investments or actions that make the network more robust rather then those with uncertain outcome but with good potential.
Cost of interruption
The purpose of applying the adjustment function illustrated in fig. 5b is that the DSOs should have incentives to strive towards a quality level that is set by the regulator, illustrated as point t b [9] . However, the task is not that simple, while the short-term implications are given by the curve's sloop for each system's quality condition, the long-term incentives include many considerations such as; the system's condition, possible investment thresholds, the expected quality development, regulatory output potentials, uncertainty in the expected output and return ratios of potential actions. By using the function illustrated in fig. 4b the DSOs can be categorised according achieved quality level: Those located below the sloop, those on the sloop and those above it. If assuming higher degree of uncertainty the more extensive the action is, the incentives that each category has to act on differ significantly. The fact that the adjustment function is floored and ceiled enables strategic planning by merging of grids and areas. For instance, large DSOs that are able to charge according to the maximum allowable revenue can incorporate smaller, poor performing DSOs. While the total allowable revenue would not reach the maximum level if the DSOs were regulated separately, the allowable revenue level for the joint grid can still be at the maximum level if assuming that the large DSO's quality surplus in the over invested 3 system is able comprehend the smaller DSOs' lack of quality. If the DSOs now operating the total system think that the risk exposure level is too high due to narrow margins towards a negative revenue adjustment, the optimal place to invest is likely to be in the area with the most profitable investmentcost function which would be the good performing area, i.e. opposite to were it might be needed.
The basic idea of the revenue adjustment function illustrated in fig. 5c is that the regulated DSOs should have incentives to uphold a quality level within the targeted dead zone (t c ). To give these implications the sloop of the curve outside the dead zone should be such that quality-increasing investments have positive return ratio below the dead zone and negative above it. When considering mean quality values the construction of such curve would be a simple task. However, depending on how the regulator chooses to configure the regulatory key features the optimal mix, when regarding risk exposure, improvement potentials and quality valuation, might be such that rather few areas are within the dead zone. The curve illustrated in fig. 4c can also be thought of as aggregated or individual quality insurances, where the customer has to pay extra if the quality is above the dead zone and receive a refund if the level of interruption are below the dead zone. In such case the DSO can negotiate with the customer on the curve characteristics and set individual functions for each area or individual customer based on the level of exposure they're willing to handle [11] .
Correlations within the regulatory framework
As discussed earlier, it is essential to understand the input-tooutput correlations within the regulatory framework. Depending on how the efficiency benchmark is conducted different actions conducted in purpose to mitigate the exposure of quality related risks can have impact on the efficiency benchmark and hence the bulk of the allowable revenue. For instance investments that significantly change the grid configuration can have this effect. One example is if a DSO invests in a new feeding point in order to increase the system reliability, if subjected to Swedish regulation such investment might change the configuration of the reference network to that extend that investment becomes unprofitable due to lesser components and shorter transmission lines in the reference network which gives lower capital costs hence lower allowable revenue. One other example is if the investment affects the environmental factors by which the regulator categorise the DSOs into comparable groups when using DEA-benchmarking for efficiency regulation. When compared to other DSOs, a better performing efficiency frontier, the regulatory output can decrease due to higher individual x-factor. However, changes in the grid configuration meant to increase system reliability can also lead to lowered energy losses, which would increase the DSOs performance and consequently lower the operational costs.
RISK MANAGEMENT IN GRID OPERATIONS
RM refers to the DSOs ability to gather information, analyse it and act on the output of the analysis. The types of actions taken to manage risks can differ significantly, from hedging in form of insurances to physical actions such as investments, maintenance. When considering the risks of quality dependent revenues within PBR, the risks can be managed by mitigating the regulatory output. In other words, performing physical actions that are optimal in such sense that the implications of step 2 -4 of the regulatory process as well as the DSOs' subjective criteria have been considered will decrease the risk exposure. This is illustrated in fig. 6 , by performing the optimal set of counter measures both the expected negative output/cost (E), step 5 in fig, 3 , as well as the uncertainty in expected output, the variance (σ 2 ), will decrease, from curve 1 to curve 2 in fig. 6 . This is also the definition of gross and net risk exposure, 1 and 2 respectively. When putting the presented RM strategy framework into a PBR environment, the general discussion can concern various areas that can be of interest to analyse further, however the lack of similarity in regulatory frameworks together with the diversity within the regulated DSOs makes the area too vast. Therefore is the generic application concentrated to the financial uncertainties of quality regulation connected to the stochastic nature of system reliability and the DSOs' ability to mitigate these risks. This is very much relevant when on markets where retail and generation of electricity is totally separated for transmission and distribution since the DSOs investment portfolios are restricted by law. 
Mitigating the uncertainty of regulatory impact
For DSOs subjected to PBR with quality dependent revenues, the objective function for regulatory output is: Maximization of the allowable revenue and minimization of regulatory uncertainty while subjected to physical, economical and regulatory constraints. For this objective, regarding step I to IV of fig. 1 the following considerations would have to be made:
i Event Identification, by performing comprehensive reliability analysis based on actual disturbance data from the own system or of a system consisting of similar components, the system's failure events and each event's probability can be estimated. The failure events are such events that would be included in step 1 of fig.  3 . Suitable methods for conducting reliability evaluations are methods that respond well to the stochastic behaviour of the system reliability such as Monte Carlo methods [6] in which the output variation also can be considered. Methods including fuzzy logics might also be suitable for certain analysis [12] .
ii Risk Evaluation, the consequences each failure event have will depend on the DSOs own ability to evaluate and correct the fault, the cost of each event depends on the affected load points 'worth of supply' which is dependent on the configuration of the key features within filters and the interruption valuation [8] , step 2 -3 in fig. 3 .
iii Counter Measures, when deciding on counter measures the impact of potential actions must be analysed. Each action's beneficial return depends primarily on two things: The improvement potential and the marginal value. The improvement potential refers to the risk evaluation, which indicates the level of improvement possible in a certain component or area. The impact of each counter measure in terms of decreased expected interruption cost can be determined based on the logged data or on simulated results, this should also include the variation of expected impact. The marginal value refers to how expected impact of the each counter measure correspond to changes in regulatory output, i.e. the adjustment function, step 4 of fig. 3 .
iv Control Function, the impact of taken counter measures can be difficult to evaluate on short term, however, the long term evaluation can be performed on various levels such as for regulatory output, performance ratios for response times, repair times, replacement times, outage rates, losses etc. The feedback is essential and demands thought through routines and procedures.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Managing the risks of quality dependent revenues by mitigation of the regulatory impact would involve most functions of the DSO's operation and planning. The main concern is about adjusting to the rules set by the regulator, which would be to act on the implications caused through the processing of the raw quality data. These incentives together with the each DSO's subjective criteria sets the terms for the decision making process for mitigating of the regulatory uncertainty.
Even if each quality regulation gives more or less strong incentives to the regulated DSO to act on, the implications vary depending on each DSO's subjective criteria. The overall agenda for the DSOs should however be to limit their risk exposure as well as to maximise the regulatory output while keeping the cost at a minimum level. Complex correlations and stochastic inputs make risk mitigation a difficult task and worked-though strategies are therefore necessary.
The natural continuation of this paper will be to implement the general strategic framework on actual grids that are subjected to real quality regulations, which would enable more specific applications and conclusions.
